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Introduction
Banks' account relationships with their Federal
Reserve Banks are changing because account
regulations are changing. The Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System began a program in
1986 to limit banks' use of daylight overdrafts,
broadened the program in 1991, and beginning in
1994 will charge a fee for daylight overdrafts that
exceed certain minimum amounts. The Board also
reduced reserve requirements to zero on nontrans-
actions deposits in 1990 and cut the highest
reserve requirement on transactions deposits from
12 percent to 10 percent in 1992.
The purpose of this article is to examine how
major changes in our central bank's rulebook
might affect Federal Reserve operations and U.S.
monetary and payments institutions. To this
end, I contrast Federal Reserve overdraft and
reserve requirement regulations — and the insti-
tutional setting in which they are administered
— with analogous rules and institutional settings
at three of the world's other leading central
banks: the Deutsche Bundesbank, the Bank of
Japan, and the Bank of England.
Do the account regulations in a central bank's
rulebook matter? Central banks in industrialized
countries all perform roughly the same functions,
centered on controlling the issuance of base
money and providing safe, final settlement of
interbank payments. They do so, however, with
apparently quite different regulations governing
the accounts of their customer banks. Some cen-
tral banks allow daylight overdrafts while others
do not; some have no reserve requirements;
and some are more ready to lend than others.
Of course, some central banks may perform
better than others, with less inflation or more
safety in their payments systems. Jiirg Niehans has
observed that "... the effects and the effectiveness
of central bank policy depend to a large extent on
technical and institutional details that vary from
one country to another and in the course of time."
(Niehans [1978], p. 263) Surely, however, major dif-
ferences in performance have more to do with a
central bank's objectives, and with its institutional
and political will to achieve them, than with its
rulebook of account regulations.
A central bank's rulebook is important, none-
theless. In addition to any costs imposed on banks,
account regulations influence the operating tech-
niques and involvement of the central bank in the
money market. With unaltered objectives, sub-
stantial changes in the Federal Reserve's rulebook
would require associated modifications in bothits operating practices and the nation's pay-
ments institutions.
The curse of considering many questions
labeled as "central banking" is the absence of an
agreed-upon frame of reference within which to
conduct the analysis. The grand perspective of
monetary theory is too broad for this purpose; it
says little about the mundane details of central
bank operations. Likewise, marginal analysis of
an individual bank's decisions under a particu-
lar set of central bank rules is too narrow; it fails
to capture systemic implications of the relevant
market institutions.
Comparison with other central banks is used
here as a way to gain perspective on the Federal
Reserve's rulebook. With or without daylight
overdrafts, and with high, low, or no reserve
requirements, each central bank is able to per-
form similar day-to-day monetary and payments
system functions. Differences in rules can be
associated with differences both in market in-
stitutions and in the way a central bank interacts
with financial markets and the banking system.
The remainder of the article is divided into
five sections. The first briefly reviews the unique
monetary and payments system functions of any
central bank. The next section compares the role
of each of the four central banks considered
here in financing customer banks' clearing im-
balances during the course of a day.
Two sections then contrast the four central
banks' techniques for maintaining policy-intended
supplies of customer banks' balances and the
monetary base. These practices involve central
bank operations that monetize and demonetize
debt (covered in section III). Some central banks
avoid lending directly to individual banks, tending
instead to use open-market operations in securi-
ties to adjust the aggregate supply of base money
and relying on markets to allocate funds among
banks. Others are more willing to bypass credit
markets by lending directly to individual banks
when adjusting aggregate supply.
The level and averaging features of reserve
requirements (covered in section IV) influence
the extent to which a central bank must respond
to daily shocks to the aggregate supply of base
money. Some rely more heavily than others on
customer banks to absorb these shocks. The
concluding section summarizes the international
comparisons and extracts some apparent lessons
about changing the Federal Reserve's rulebook.
I. Monetary and
Payments Functions
of a Central Bank
As the monetary authority, a modern central
bank controls the supply of "outside," or base,
money. This anchors the price level in the long
run while allowing a central bank to respond to
variations in the economy over the business
cycle and to liquidity needs in the short run.
As the banker for commercial and other banks
operating in its country, a central bank is able to
settle interbank payments because it is the unique
common site of banks' deposit accounts: A simple
bookkeeping transfer from one account to another
can settle payments involving any two banks.
In the same way, a central bank is able to settle
payments to and from its government or official
foreign institutions that hold deposit accounts
with it. In short, the central banks of most
industrialized countries control the aggregate
supply of base money while transferring owner-
ship of banks' base-money balances to settle
the daily clearing of payments.
Monetary policy deals with the growth rate of
the monetary base. Raising or lowering this rate
has the immediate effect of, or is brought about
by, changing the interest rate at which banks
can acquire very short-run funding of their ac-
counts at the central bank. Ignoring completely
any questions about monetary policy, the ques-
tion I address here is how a central bank recon-
ciles banks' need for settlement with its own
need to maintain a targeted level of base money.
Rules about the account balances banks hold
at the central bank are necessary if the central
bank is to control the monetary base. Private
banks have no earnings incentive to hold any
substantial balance in their accounts with the
central bank, because such balances typically
earn no interest.
1 If a bank foresees ending the
day with a positive balance, it can lend that
amount overnight in markets for funds with
same-day payment. Moreover, banks are no dif-
ferent from their own customers: Absent penal-
ties, they have every incentive to use overdrafts
as a dependable source of financing, not only
during a day, but overnight. This means that in
the absence of overdraft and reserve require-
ment rules, all banks would have an incentive
to create balances at the central bank by over-
draft, but no incentive to hold all the balances
being created.
• 1 For a rare instance of interest-bearing reserve assets, see
Dotsey (1991).Sources of
Daylight Credit
Enforcing a rule against overnight overdrafts
allows a central bank to limit the supply of base
money each day. Scarce base money is available
only to those who pass a market test (by selling
goods, services, or existing securities or by bor-
rowing). This does not, however, limit the intra-
day supply of base money created by temporary,
"daylight" extensions of credit. Much of the daily
activity of banks involves daylight credit, which
must be repaid by day's end to avoid overnight
overdrafts.
In modern industrialized economies, deposi-
tors draw checks and other payment orders on
their bank accounts as the immediate quid pro
quo for many market transactions, and banks
use base money (or deposits at other banks) to
settle interbank clearing imbalances. Even pay-
ments with same-day settlement can involve
delays that make it possible for banks to "pay
out" more money than they have on hand at the
moment. They rely on daylight credit provided
by those institutions that must wait for settle-
ment before being paid in safe base money.
Clearinghouses are a common source of day-
light credit. Routine, standardized transactions
within groups of banks, securities dealers, or
members of exchanges can be covered by blan-
ket agreements about who can do how much
business on credit from the other members of
the group prior to settlement, and about how to
apportion losses if one of its members is unable
to settle.
A central bank provides daylight credit if it
makes final payments during the day for customer
banks lacking sufficient balances to cover pay-
ments as they are made. The amount added to the
supply of balances will be drained, all else equal,
only when a borrowing bank repays the overdraft.
Repaying Daylight
Credit
Repayment of daylight credit from either source
should be routine even if banks hold zero bal-
ances at the central bank overnight. If all trans-
actions simply involve payments among banks,
zero balances are sufficient: What some banks
lose from adverse clearings during a day, other
banks gain. The losers should be able to bor-
row or buy what they need from the gainers to
cover their positions, as long as they have ac-
cess to markets with same-day payment.
Difficulties may arise if there is an aggregate
shortage of balances in the banking system as a
whole. If banks normally hold no excess balances
at the central bank, such a shortage will occur on
any day during which banks' balances at the
central bank are drained into currency, govern-
ment or foreign accounts, or other miscellaneous
accounts on the central bank's balance sheet.
With too few balances to go around, one or more
banks will be unable to repay daylight credit ex-
tended by a clearinghouse or the central bank.
Three mechanisms might allow banks to
acquire the funds needed to repay daylight
credit, despite uncontrolled factors draining bal-
ances. One is a central bank's "defensive" mar-
ket operations. These are designed specifically
to offset uncontrolled factors draining (or add-
ing) base money. Banks' balances decline
whenever a central bank reduces its assets or
increases its other liabilities or capital, all else
equal. Defensive operations are simply central
bank actions taken to offset an undesired net
change in all of the factors affecting the aggre-
gate amount of its constituent banks' balances.
The central bank supplies or drains balances in
the aggregate, relying on the market to distrib-
ute balances to those banks that need them.
Arbitrage associated with reserve require-
ments is a second mechanism that allows the
banking system itself to absorb uncontrolled
deviations of the aggregate supply of balances
around a policy-intended level. A binding
reserve requirement for an averaging period
creates an aggregate average demand for cen-
tral bank balances on the part of banks. The
average quantity demanded, however, can be
deferred or brought forward on any day in re-
sponse to movements in interbank interest rates.
This interday arbitrage both absorbs the "noise"
from uncontrolled supply factors that are offset-
ting during a reserve averaging period and
dampens associated variations in interest rates.
2
A third mechanism is direct loans from the
central bank, whereby it acts as a pure liquidity-
motivated lender of last resort to the banking
system. Direct lending is used primarily as an
• 2 The power of a reserve requirement to produce noise-absorbing
arbitrage has limits, however, at least in the short run. On the low side,
problems can arise if payments are made by direct transfers of central
bank balances, but the central bank limits the availability of daylight over-
drafts. Even though banks may be willing to postpone holding overnight
balances, there may be too few balances to allow all banks to meet their
payment needs during a day within the existing institutional environment.
On the high side, some banks might inadvertently accumulate such large
reserve positions early in an averaging period that they could avoid ex-
cess reserves for the whole period only by running overnight overdrafts,
which are prohibited (Dumitru and Stevens [1991]).escape valve when defensive operations and
reserve averaging fail to offset factors draining
reserves from the nation's banks, or when unex-
pected factors increase reserve demand. Banks
normally are discouraged from relying on direct
central bank loans, with lending rationed by
administrative decision (Banks of England and
Japan), by banks' reluctance to borrow (Federal
Reserve), or by a loan rate that generally ex-
ceeds market rates (Bundesbank). For these rea-
sons, individual banks typically do not plan to
repay daylight credit by borrowing directly from
the central bank. Instead, they try to acquire bal-
ances in the market — balances created deliber-
ately by the central bank and coaxed out of the
holdings of other banks.
Repayment problems might arise, however,
even with no aggregate shortage of balances at
the central bank. A bank may be unable to repay
daylight credit because either its incipient failure
or an operational problem (such as a computer
breakdown) prevents borrowing from, or selling
assets to, other banks with excess balances at the
central bank. Central bank, commercial bank, and
clearinghouse rules that prevent unlimited use of
daylight credit protect against this problem.
Conceptually, this source of repayment
problems can be reserved for a fuller discussion
of central banks' lender-of-last-resort and bank
supervision functions.
3 As a practical matter,
however, a central bank may have difficulty
maintaining such a clean distinction between
direct lending as a safety valve for aggregate
shortages of reserve balances and the importun-
ing of either troubled banks or (in the United
• 3 The daylight credit involved in making payments causes well-
known payments system risk problems for banks, their clearinghouses,
and their central banks. In particular, a central bank needs to manage
credit risk.
Daylight credit extensions on private net settlement systems can in-
volve systemic risk problems. If payment finality is guaranteed by a
clearinghouse (a regulatory requirement advocated by the major central
banks), failure of a bank to cover a negative position at settlement re-
quires other participants to make up the difference. Such guarantees are
now explicit in the rules of the Clearing House Interbank Payments Sys-
tem (CHIPS) in the United States and the Gaiteme (Foreign Exchange)
Yen System in Japan.
An alternative structure makes payment finality contingent on suc-
cessful completion of the settlement process at the end of a day, as in the
Towne Clearing of same-day paper check payments in London. In such
instances, a bank's failure to cover a negative position precludes settle-
ment and implies disintegration of the day's payments, leaving their
status subject to negotiation or litigation. Another possibility, explicit in
the rules of some clearinghouses, is to "unwind" the settlement; that is,
to exclude all payments to and from the offending bank and calculate a
new settlement. However, at least in the case of large-value, same-day
networks, the typical perception is that a central bank would prevent disin-
tegration, or an unwinding, by lending to ensure successful completion
of the original settlement (Stevens [1989], Bank for International Settle-
ments [1990b]).
States) banks attempting to take advantage of a
below-market discount rate.
II. Daylight Credit
Private clearinghouses operate in each of the four
countries considered here, with same-day net set-
tlement on the books of the central bank. In addi-
tion, the Federal Reserve Banks, the Bundesbank,
and the Bank of Japan operate their own on-line
payment networks that enable banks to make im-
mediate payments throughout a day by transferring
central bank balances directly to other banks.
4
Central bank daylight overdrafts are pro-
vided only in the United States and Germany,
from payments made on the Fedwire electronic
network operated by the regional Federal
Reserve Banks, and on the express electronic
and paper transfer network operated by the
Bundesbank. Both systems include thousands
of participants and are dominated by large-
value payments. However, the incidence of
daylight overdrafts might be expected to be
greater on Fedwire, where they average more
than $100 billion daily, than on the Bundesbank
system. This is because the value of payments
relative to gross domestic product (GDP) made
on Fedwire is more than five times greater than
on the Bundesbank network, and the ratio of
payments to balances is more than 30 times
larger (Bank for International Settlements
[1990a], Board of Governors [1989]).
The Federal Reserve permits daylight over-
drafts for most banks within established limits, but
will begin phasing in a fee of 25 basis points (an-
nual rate) in 1994.
5 Compliance with limits is
verified on an ex post basis, rather than by pre-
venting excess payments (as is now done, for
instance, on the CHIPS large-value transfer sys-
tem). The Bundesbank, in contrast, apparently
does not execute payments that would produce a
daylight overdraft exceeding a bank's preexisting
collateral, and does not impose a fee.
The Bank of Japan's large-value same-day
payments systems (Bank of Japan Cheque and
Financial Network Systems) are comparable to
those of the Federal Reserve Banks and the
Bundesbank. However, the Bank of Japan will
not execute payments that would result in a
daylight overdraft. To acquire balances in time
I 4 Descriptions of the four nations'payment mechanisms can be
found in Bank for International Settlements (1985,1990a).
• 5 A small number of banks with daylight overdrafts in excess of
limits and arising from transfers of Treasury securities in the Federal
Reserve book-entry system must post collateral.TABLE 1
Combined Balance Sheet of
the Federal Reserve Banks
a
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a. As of December 31, 1990. All figures are expressed in millions of dollars.
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to make payments, banks must manage their
balances throughout a day, perhaps by borrow-
ing intraday or overnight, or by selling assets
during a day for payment over the network.
Whereas the Bank of Japan prohibits daylight
overdrafts, the Bank of England does not provide
them because it doesn't operate any payments sys-
tems. Interbank payments take place entirely
through private clearinghouse arrangements, not
on the books of the central bank. Each day, only
the net settlement position of a bank vis-a-vis all
other banks in one or more clearinghouses is set-
tled using the bank's account at the central bank.
Even if a bank could settle its clearinghouse posi-
tion only with an overnight overdraft or loan from
the Bank of England, the Bank has no formal
responsibility to guarantee settlement.
In the past, Federal Reserve provision of day-
light overdrafts clearly was more liberal than at
the other three central banks. Until 1986, no
limits were imposed and no collateral was re-
quired for healthy depository institutions. Pro-
vision began to move toward comparability in
1986, with the adoption of the potentially more
restrictive current limits, based on a bank's capi-
tal. With the imposition of a fee in 1994, Federal
Reserve provision will become somewhat more
like that of the other central banks.
III. Defensive
Operations
The level of short-term interest rates is the effec-
tive policy instrument of each of the four central
banks considered here. Defensive operations are
deliberate actions taken to insulate the supply
of base money, and thereby the level of directly
affected short-term interest rates, from uncon-
trolled changes that are inconsistent with policy
intentions. Most defensive operations take place
within the daily market period in which shortest-
term interest rates reflect the forces of demand
and supply in the market for banks' balances —
what Niehans calls "the ultrashort-run liquidity
of the banking system." (Niehans [1978], chap-
ter 12) The length of the ultrashort run — from
a few minutes to as much as a week — may be
related to reserve requirement arrangements,
which are discussed in section IV.
All four central banks use one or both of two
basic techniques in their defensive operations:
1) managing flows of banks' balances to and
from government and official foreign accounts
at the central bank, and 2) using market transac-
tions and lending to offset unmanaged factors
affecting the central bank balance sheet or inter-
est rates. In what follows, I discuss the use of
these techniques by each of the four banks.
Federal Reserve
The Fed uses both techniques. Monetizing gov-
ernment securities through outright purchases in
the secondary market or directly from foreign cus-
tomers is the dominant source of base money in
the United States (see table 1). Fluctuations in the
Treasury's balance at the Reserve Banks, if not
offset, change the supply of banks' balances at
the Fed. This is avoided, for the most part, by
having the Treasury maintain two sets of deposit
accounts: one with banks, to which its receipts
are paid, and another at the Federal ReserveTABLE 2
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a. As of December 31, 1989. All figures are expressed in millions of marks.
b. 92 percent of balances.
SOURCE: Deutsche Bundesbank.
Banks, from which its payments are made. The
Treasury can transfer funds from the receiving
accounts to the paying accounts each morning
to offset the day's projected payments. This
practice leaves a relatively constant projected
target balance in the paying accounts, prevent-
ing Treasury operations from adding or draining
banks' balances.
6
Defensive operations are used to offset short-
run variations in the public's demand for curren-
cy and in banks' demand for required balances,
as well as in a host of miscellaneous items. The
vehicle for temporary defensive operations is re-
purchase agreements (RPs) in the secondary mar-
ket for Treasury securities — that is, purchases (to
add balances) with an agreement to resell, or sales
(to drain balances) with an agreement to buy
back, one or a few days later. Transactions are
conducted by inviting bids from designated (pri-
mary) dealers and by accepting enough bids to fill
the projected need on a best-bid basis. These fre-
quent, temporary adjustments can be used to fine-
tune the supply of balances on a daily basis. When
needed, transactions take place at about 11:30
a.m., based on projections of demand and of
• 6 Banks'balances at the Federal Reserve Banks could be completely
insulated from the effects of Treasury operations (within projection er-
rors), were it not for occasional episodes when 1) paying accounts must
move above the normal target because receipts exceed banks' limited will-
ingness to hold Treasury deposits, or 2) receiving accounts are exhausted
and the paying accounts must be drawn down below the normal target be-
cause the Treasury is constrained from issuing new debt.
factors affecting supply. The banking system
must accommodate any deviation of actual
from projected balances for the day, although
as noted above, a substantial shortfall could
force banks to borrow at the discount window.
Defensive operations are not always based
on projected quantities. The Fed's proximate mon-
etary policy target is perceived as a level of the
overnight interbank (federal funds) rate. Devia-
tions of the funds rate from target can indicate
projection errors or market expectations that are
inconsistent with policy. Operations in the second-
ary market, therefore, may be intended to defend
or to correct the market's perception of the
interest-rate policy target (Meulendyke [1989]) •
Bundesbank
In contrast to the Federal Reserve, the Bundes-
bank does not rely on outright purchases of
government securities as its dominant means of
supplying base money (see table 2). A large por-
tion of base money is supplied (within estab-
lished "refinancing" quotas) through purchases
of domestic and foreign bills of exchange with
maturities of several months. Banks sell these
instruments to the central bank at the official
discount rate, which is typically below market
rates. An even larger source of base money orig-
inates from the continuous rollover of RPs of
one- and two-month maturities.TABLE 3
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Total 49,157
a. As of December 31, 1990. All figures are expressed in billions of yen.
b. 126 percent of balances.
SOURCE: Bank of Japan.
The Bundesbank adjusts the aggregate sup-
ply of banks' balances weekly, typically by regu-
lating the volume of RPs accepted. Other means
of adjustment include shifting federal govern-
ment deposits to banks, foreign exchange
swaps or RPs, and sales of special short-maturity
Treasury bills. But, for the most part, any re-
maining need for short-run adjustments must
come at the initiative of the banks themselves,
by varying their Lombard borrowing from the
Bundesbank (collateralized by eligible securi-
ties) at the Bank's Lombard rate. This rate always
is higher than the discount rate and typically is
higher than market rates (Deutsche Bundesbank
[1985, 1990]).
The Bundesbank also has an opportunity to
indicate when the overnight interbank rate has
been affected by either projection errors (under-
supply, for example, would be expected to drive
the rate up toward the Lombard rate) or a market
perception of rates inconsistent with actual policy
intentions. Both the cutoff rate in accepting RPs
and the volume accepted can provide short-run
signals to the market. A more direct signal can be
given by inviting tenders for RPs at a designated
interest rate, rather than by simply accepting the
best rates offered for a desired quantity.
Bank of Japan
Like the Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan
holds a large portfolio of government securities
whose outright purchase is the dominant source
of base money (see table 3). The Bank also can
operate in a variety of other markets to adjust
the monetary base and to influence conditions
in specific markets. These actions include en-
gaging in Treasury bill and commercial paper
RPs, purchases and sales of commercial bills
(including sales of Bank of Japan bills), and
sales of government bills with an RP. In addi-
tion, a pivotal group of large banks is continu-
ously indebted to the central bank, within
established lines of credit, at the basic discount
rate, which is typically below interbank lending
rates (Tatewaki [1991]).
The Bank of Japan has two daily oppor-
tunities to adjust the supply of balances. One is
through operations in the market (typified by
commercial paper RPs) aimed at the market rate
on uncollateralized interbank call loans — the
counterpart to the federal funds rate in the
United States. The second is by a later daily
decision about the quantity of loans the Bank
will extend or collect. This lending decision is
made shortly before 3:00 p.m., when same-day
transactions in the call loan market must end
(because the Bank's same-day payments net-
work closes), but about an hour after same-day
net positions on the Gaiteme foreign-exchange
net settlement network have been calculated.
Thus, Bank of Japan lending decisions can ac-
commodate a need for balances, or put upward
or downward pressure on the call loan market,
based on information accumulated during the
day. The Bank assists the market in distinguish-
ing defensive operations from those with policy
implications by releasing data, also at 3:00 p.m.,
showing demand and supply of funds and itsTABLE 4











































a. As of February 28, 1990. All figures are expressed in millions of pounds.
SOURCE: Bank of England.
own market operations for that day, as well as
an estimate for the next day (Nakao and Horii
[1991], Bank for International Settlements [1986,
1990a], and Bank of Japan [1991]).
Bank of England
The Bank of England maintains an accounting
distinction between two departments. The Issue
Department supplies currency, which finances
outright holdings of government and other
securities. The Banking Department supplies the
small amount of banks' deposit balances (there
are no reserve requirements), largely by dis-
counting (purchasing) eligible securities and
through collateralized lending (see table 4).
Weekly government bill tenders normally drain
enough funds from the banking system to the
government's account to create a persistent
shortage of balances, requiring daily defensive
operations to add balances back into the system.
Procedures for defensive operations are
elaborate, because banks' small cushion of
desired "target" balances provides little room
for error in draining or adding balances each
day. Banks report their targets to the Bank of
England, and at three times during the day, the
Bank reports its estimate of the day's shortage
or surplus of balances relative to the aggregate
of these targets. Open-market operations typi-
cally are carried out with the discount houses,
which in turn provide banks with daily financ-
ing facilities.
Operations might be conducted after publica-
tion of the first estimate of the day's balance
position, if the need is large. More often, the
Bank operates after releasing its noon update of
estimated need. A third round of operations
may come after the Bank's 2:00 p.m. update. A
further opportunity to adjust comes through
"late assistance" in the form of secured lending
to discount houses and other money brokers,
which may extend later into the afternoon.
Operations at any of these times can do more
than simply adjust the quantity of balances. The
Bank has discretion over the type of operation
(outright, RP, lending), whether it invites transac-
tions or responds to requests, and the terms on
which it will engage in transactions (type of secur-
ity, maturity, and "stop rate"). Manipulation of these
variables, in conjunction with the Bank's published
estimates of the day's position, provides an oppor-
tunity for the Bank to clarify its policy intentions
while engaging in defensive operations (Bank for
International Settlements [1986,1990a], Bank of
England [1988]).Summary
All four central banks engage in defensive oper-
ations along the twin dimensions of quantity of
balances and level of interest rates. Where con-
trol of the quantity of balances is not effective
or, for some other reason, market expectations
are not consistent with policy intentions, the
central banks can manipulate the types and
terms of their market operations to provide sig-
nals — interpreted on the basis of market tradi-
tions — about the level of interest rates thought
to be consistent with policy intentions. No
amount of such suasion can be effective, how-
ever, if not supported by control of the quantity
of balances.
Clear differences are visible in the degree to
which any of the four central banks might be ex-
pected to seek precise control of the daily aggre-
gate supply of balances and relevant interest
rates using defensive operations. The Bundes-
bank's reliance on weekly RPs leaves the daily
supply of balances subject to uncontrolled fac-
tors that might move interest rates within the
ceiling provided by the Lombard rate. Federal
Reserve reliance on morning open-market
operations, guided only by projections, means
that the actual daily supply of balances is sub-
ject to projection errors, although daily signals
may be sufficient to maintain clarity about the
level of interest rates consistent with policy in-
tentions.
7 The Bank of Japan, by making
decisions about lending and repayment late in
the day — after one clearinghouse has closed
and immediately before the close of another —
is in a better position to avoid projection errors
in its daily defensive operations. The Bank of
England, relying on successive estimates, opera-
tions, and late assistance over the course of a
single day, can minimize projection errors by
using repeated updates of market information




A banking system is in a better position to absorb
day-to-day uncontrolled variations in the supply
of balances when banks must meet reserve re-
quirements. The central bank must eliminate any
net excess or deficiency of balances by the end of
the reserve averaging period, but not every day.
A bank calculates its required reserves by
matching various reservable deposits with their
respective reserve ratios. Specifications of both
reservable deposits and reserve ratios differ in
widely inventive ways among the four central
banks. These computational features influence
the net after-reserves marginal cost of bank
lending financed by various types of deposits.
They also might be germane to monetary policy
operations. For example, predictability of de-
mand for reservable balances and the accuracy
of projections underlying defensive operations
are affected by shifts among deposit accounts
having different reserve ratios.
8 However, these
features will not be considered here because
they are not of foremost importance to the inter-
action of central banks' reserve requirement
rules with their monetary and payments system
operations in the "ultrashort run." Rather, of in-
terest here are 1) the average quantity of non-
interest-bearing reserve balances that banks
must hold and 2) the length of the averaging
period over which banks can spread this
artificial demand and over which the central
bank can spread its supply.
Three of the four central banks had reserve
requirement regulations in 1990. The aggregate
quantity of required balances in each country
can be compared directly only by choosing ex-
change rates at which to convert to a common
currency. Examining the ratio of required bal-
ances to a country's GDP avoids this complica-
tion, while making a rough adjustment for
differences in the scale of national economies.
9
Both methods of comparison are shown in table
5, with required and excess balances converted
to U.S. dollars, as well as scaled by each coun-
try's nominal GDP.
• 7 "Large" projection errors occurred on 27 days in 1991, according
to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, but "large" is undefined. The
New York Bank conducts a weekly Thursday press briefing that reviews in
general terms the factors affecting banks' reserve balances during the
week ending the previous day. Among other items, the briefing indicates
either 1) that there were no large net one-day deviations from projections,
or 2) the days on which there were large deviations, giving their sign and
source but not their dollar values.
• 8 A convenient comparison of the basis for computing required
reserves in the four countries can be found in Kneeshaw and Van den
Bergh (1989). The irrelevance of methods of computation for monetary
policy implementation is discussed in Stevens (1991).
• 9 An alternative scale adjustment is to take the ratio of required
balances to total deposits (whether subject to requirements or not) of all
institutions that are subject to requirements. The rank order is the same
























































a. 1990 annual averages. Currency conversions are at the annual average exchange rate.
b. Reserve requirements were cut substantially in December 1990 and April 1992. The average dollar amount of required plus clearing bal-
ances declined 25 percent between May 1990 and May 1992.
c. Includes (after rounding) 0.59 percent of required balances and 0.03 percent of clearing balances.
d. Ninety-one days for small banks.
e. 1989 values are used to avoid discontinuity caused by reunification.
f. Holdings of vault cash cannot be deducted from required reserves in calculating required balances.
g. Excludes "cash ratio" deposits.
SOURCES: Bank of England, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Deutsche Bundesbank, Bank of Japan, and the International
Monetary Fund.
Federal Reserve
In the United States, large banks must meet
reserve requirements within a basic 14-day
averaging period. Each bank can rely on daily
market transactions to manage balances, aided
by a provision for carryover of excesses or
deficiencies into the next 14-day period that
creates a limited 28-day averaging period.
1
0
A bank's holdings of vault cash, as well as its
deposit balance at a regional Reserve Bank, are
eligible to satisfy the legal reserve requirement.
Even some of the largest institutions satisfy their
entire requirement with vault cash.
In addition to a legal reserve requirement,
many banks contract to hold required clearing
balances during a reserve maintenance period.
These required balances are administered on
the same basis as the legal requirement, but
yield earnings credits at the level of the federal
funds rate with which to pay for Reserve Banks'
• 10 The Federal Reserve appears to be unique in allowing this addi-
tional averaging between adjacent periods (see Kneeshaw and Van den
Bergh [1989]). A deficiency or excess of up to 4 percent of required re-
serves (increased from 2 percent in 1992) can be carried into the next
averaging period (but not beyond). Because many banks satisfy a large
portion of their reserve requirement with vault cash, eligible carryover can
be much larger than 4 percent of required balances.
priced services. Failure to maintain at least the
required amount of vault cash plus legal and
clearing balances, after carryover, results in a
fee levied on the deficiency at a rate of 2 per-
centage points above the discount rate. This
charge, in addition to administrative oppro-
brium, makes deficiencies rare.
Bundesbank
Required balances in Germany are of an order
of magnitude roughly comparable in dollar
value to the aggregate quantity held by U.S. and
Japanese banks, but are substantially higher rel-
ative to GDP. In addition, a long, 30-day averag-
ing period provides the German banking system
with a substantial ability to absorb offsetting
variations in the daily supply of balances. All in-
stitutions subject to reserve requirements must
maintain a required deposit balance. Vault cash
is eligible to meet requirements, but only up to
50 percent of the amount of a bank's required
reserve. Failure to satisfy the reserve require-
ment results in a penalty at a rate 3 percentage
points above the Lombard rate (which itself is
typically higher than market rates).Bank of Japan
Required reserves in Japan, while of the same
order of dollar magnitude as those in Germany
and the United States, stand in an intermediate
position when measured relative to GDP—al-
most twice the U.S. ratio, but only half the Ger-
man ratio. Like German banks, Japanese banks
maintain required reserves within a 30-day
averaging period, providing the banking system
with a significant ability to absorb offsetting
daily variations in the supply of balances. All re-
quired reserves must be held as balances with
the Bank of Japan: Vault cash holdings do not
satisfy reserve requirements. The penalty for a
reserve deficiency is a rate 3.75 percentage
points above the official discount rate.
Bank of England
The United Kingdom is unique among the four
countries in having no reserve requirement
regulation.
1
1 Banks do target, and hold, self-
determined levels of operating balances as a
buffer against lower-than-expected clearing-
house net positions at the end of a day. In the
aggregate, however, this practice has almost
none of the shock-absorbing function asso-
ciated with a reserve requirement: It is impos-
sible for banks to accommodate daily variations
in the aggregate supply of balances by postpon-
ing or accelerating the accumulation of bal-
ances. Extra balances today are worthless on
future days, while an unexpected shortage
today can be no greater than target balances.
And target balances are quite small — about
one one-hundredth of required balances in Ger-
many, and normally smaller than the size of




There is no obvious rationale for the observed
national differences in the level of balances a
banking system is required to maintain on
• 11 Institutions with more than minimum amounts of eligible
liabilities must hold nonoperational, non-interest-bearing "cash ratio"
deposits, fixed for six-month intervals at about one-half of 1 percent of
both demand and term deposits (without averaging) to finance the Bank-
ing Department of the Bank of England. This arrangement is more nearly
analogous to the Fed's requirement that member banks hold stock in a
Federal Reserve Bank than to a reserve requirement.
deposit at its central bank. One striking associa-
tion can be detected: Less frequent defensive
operations tend to be related to higher require-
ments that allow the banking system itself to ab-
sorb daily, offsetting variations in the supply of
balances. The Bundesbank, with the highest
level of required balances, tends to rely on
weekly operations; the Federal Reserve, with an
intermediate level of required balances, tends
to rely on daily operations; the Bank of Eng-
land, with no required balances, may take action
as frequently as four times a day.
Association is not explanation, however. Are
reserve requirements lower because a central
bank is more assiduous in controlling the supply
of balances, or does a central bank control the
supply of balances more assiduously because
reserve requirements are lower? Moreover, the
association is not consistent across the four cen-
tral banks: The relatively high level of require-
ments in Japan would seem to allow the Bank
of Japan to be less attentive than it is in conduct-
ing defensive operations.
Other factors that might account for differences
do not explain much, either. Longer averaging
periods could be a substitute for higher require-
ments, but that is not the pattern actually observed
(see table 5).
1
2 Provision of daylight overdrafts
could likewise substitute for higher balances, but
no such pattern is evident. For example, while the
Bank of Japan prohibits daylight overdrafts, the
level of required balances relative to GDP is only
half that of the Bundesbank, which does allow
such transactions.
Perhaps another factor is at work. A central
bank might offset the "tax" of a relatively high
reserve requirement with the "subsidy" of loans
to banks at below-market rates. A perfect offset
would leave the marginal cost of lending unaf-
fected by reserve requirements, but none of the
four central banks operates this way. More likely
is a partial offset to the total cost of operating
within all the rules of the central bank. The na-
tional basis for this offset is indicated in the foot-
notes to tables 1-3, as measured by total central
bank assets acquired from the banking system
at subsidy rates, divided by banks' required
balances held with the central bank.
The ratio of subsidized assets to required
balances varies from about zero at the Federal
Reserve Banks to a high of 126 percent at the
Bank of Japan. These values provide some
evidence that the cost of required balances may
• 12 Extra days could replace extra balances in deferring and accel-
erating the accumulation of required balances while accommodating a
given pattern of variations in supply; supply variations might be more
likely to be offsetting over longer averaging periods.not be as unequal as their levels, but that the off-
set from the subsidy cannot equalize cost. For
example, a simple calculation suggests that the
Bundesbank would have to maintain a negative
discount rate in refinancing bills of exchange if
it were to offset the difference between the
GDP-based measure of its required balances
and that of the Federal Reserve.
1
3 Moreover,
even a plausible association between required
balances and subsidized assets would not ex-
plain why nations might choose these different
institutional patterns.
Just as it is impossible to explain why reserve
requirements differ, so, too, it is hard to explain
variations in the average level of excess balances
among the four banking systems (see table 5).
One interpretation of excess balances might be
that they measure the accuracy of a central
bank's defensive operations. If banks have no
incentive to hold non-interest-bearing idle bal-
ances, defensive operations must aim at zero
excess balances to prevent extreme volatility in
interbank interest rates.
Information about excess balances alone is
not sufficient to justify this interpretation, how-
ever. Even if a central bank were able to achieve
zero excess balances, normal practice would be
to target a positive level, demanded by banks in
the aggregate. Individual banks have an incen-
tive to target small excess balances on the last
day of a reserve averaging period. This reflects
the monetary and nonmonetary penalties for
failing to meet requirements, coupled with each
bank's inevitable uncertainty about both the in-
cidence of unplanned, last-minute transactions
and the accuracy of its record keeping. Observed
excess balances may reflect actual demand, not
inaccurate supply.
A bank operating in the context of a positive
requirement normally will have a cushion of
balances so that it can operate closer to a zero
target for excess balances than a bank with no
balance requirement. With a requirement, the
cushion is lacking only on the last day of a
reserve maintenance period, when the bank
can no longer postpone or accelerate the accu-
mulation of required balances; without a re-
quirement, the cushion is lacking every day.
This may explain why excess balances are
highest at the Bank of England — assuming, of
• 13 Let R equal the market rate forgone on reserve balances, and
s equal the subsidy to that rate for central bank loans. In the case of the
Bundesbank, for example, from the values in tables 2 and 5,
0.92s =2.52/?- 0.61 R.
That is, s = 1.92ft The level of the subsidy would be almost twice the
level of the market rate, implying a negative loan rate at the central bank.
course, that actual balances are an indication of
banks' desired balances rather than of errors in
defensive operations.
Lower excess balances at the Bundesbank
may reflect another difference: German banks
may be willing to set targets closer to zero ex-
cess balances because they can rely on Lombard
borrowing to round out their reserve position at
the last moment on the last day of an averaging
period, albeit at an above-market price (and not
repeatedly). The Bank of England and the Fed-
eral Reserve Banks do not maintain lending
facilities as hospitable to last-minute borrowing
by individual banks. Bank of Japan lending
might account for the minuscule level of excess
balances in that country, either as a means of
achieving precision in supplying balances or,
given such precision, as a reflection of low de-
mand on the part of individual banks in antici-
pation of precise supply.
V. Conclusion
The central banks of the United States, Germany,
Japan, and the United Kingdom perform the same
basic functions. In the payments system, they pro-
vide safe, base money both as currency and as
banks' deposit balances, as well as a facility for set-
tling clearinghouse payments through bookkeep-
ing transfers of banks' balances. In addition, the
Federal Reserve, Bundesbank, and Bank of Japan
all provide a system for making same-day pay-
ments by direct transfers of banks' balances. Each
attempts to provide the quantity of base money
required to maintain short-term interest rates at
policy-desired levels.
To facilitate payments, some central banks (the
Banks of Japan and England) rely entirely on
clearinghouse organizations to supplement the
supply of base money with daylight credit. Others
(the Federal Reserve and Bundesbank) supple-
ment the supply of base money themselves during
the day by providing daylight overdrafts.
All four central banks engage in defensive
operations designed to insulate the overnight
supply of banks' balances and the level of short-
term interest rates from the temporary effects of
variations in currency holdings, government
balances, and other uncontrolled factors. The
four differ, however, in the extent to which
reserve requirements enable the banking sys-
tem itself to accommodate day-to-day shocks to
the supply of banks' balances arising from these
factors. The contrast is most apparent between
the Bank of England, with no reserve require-
ments and multiple defensive operations eachTABLE 6
Summary Comparison of Central
Bank Rules and Operations, 1990
Federal Reserve Bundesbank Bank of Japan Bank of England




Yes, within line of Yes, within limit of
credit, monitored Lombard collateral;










































day, and the Bundesbank, with high reserve re-
quirements and major reliance on weekly defen-
sive operations.
The fundamental lesson of this study is that
there is no unique set of rules a central bank
must impose on the banking system (see table
6). Monetary and payments system functions
can be carried out under a variety of rules and
regulations whose relative costs would be enor-
mously difficult to establish.
Applying this lesson to the Federal Reserve
helps to clarify some recent issues. A common
apprehension about limiting banks' daylight
overdrafts has been the possibility of payments
system "gridlock," which some fear would re-
quire banks either to hold costly excess balances
at the Federal Reserve Banks or to develop a
finely tuned system for trading and transferring
balances on an hourly or partial-day basis. Ex-
perience in nations whose central banks do not
provide daylight credit suggests another likely
alternative: Banks will rely more extensively on
private clearinghouses in making payments.
Lowering, or even eliminating, reserve re-
quirements has considerable appeal in the
United States, where their apparent burden on
banks' domestic and global competitiveness
seems unrelated to their statutory monetary
policy rationale. Deregulating the banking sys-
tem by removing reserve requirements, how-
ever, would have the seemingly paradoxical
effect of increasing, rather than decreasing, the
pivotal role of the central bank in the money
market. As in the case of the Bank of England,
assiduous defensive market intervention could
be necessary each day simply to match the daily
supply of banks' balances with any residual
precautionary demand. Alternatively, copying
the Bundesbank's Lombard facility, the Federal
Reserve Banks' discount window lending could
play a larger defensive role if administrative and
market discouragement of borrowing were
abandoned in favor of a penalty discount rate.References
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